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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CHARLES L. BENNETT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

Case No.
7287

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Salt Lake
County, in favor of the plaintiff below. The total verdict
was in the sum of $70,000, but the jury deducted therefrom
the sum of $20,000 by reason of the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff, thereby returning a net verdict for $50,000
(R. 72). The accident and injury complained of by the
plaintiff, Charles L. Bennett, age 26 years, occurred about
8:3,5 p. m. on January 7, 1948, in the yards· of The Denver
and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, at Buena Vista,
Colorado ( R. 2, 13) .
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Prior to the accident, the plaintiff was working as
head brakeman on an eastbound freight train, known as
local No. 36 (R. 131). The freight train, consisting of about
sixty freight cars and a four unit diesel engine, arrived in
Buena Vista at about 7 :40 p. m. (R. 135). It was dark at
the time ( R. 137) . Most of the cars of the train were left
standing on the main line track, while the engine engaged
in various switching movements in the yard. Plaintiff
assisted ~in these movements (R. 137-144). After several
switching operations, the engine arrived at a position facing
south on the stock or ice house track, coupled ahead of a
string of fourteen freight cars (R. 147). As shown by the
map, plaintiff's Exhibit D, the stock or ice house track extends in a north and south direction, parallel with the main
line and passing tracks located just to the east. The stock
or ice house track commences in the vicinity of an ice house
at the north end of the yard and runs southerly for approximately 3,000 feet. At its southerly point it joins with
the passing track just north of where that track crosses the
main street of Buena Vista. The passing track then con- .
tinues southerly approximately 400 feet, crosses the main
street, passes in front of the railroad depot, and joins the
main line track at a point known as the main line switch.
The plaintiff was injured as the engine and the cut of
fourteen cars moved southerly (eastward according to railroad directions) on the ice house or stock track. He was
stationed on the top of the rear or fourteenth car, in order
to pass signals forward to the engineer and fireman in the
cab of the locomotive (R. 144-145). The engine and cut of
cars started from a position just south of the ice house and
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moved forward at a slow speed, in response to a lantern
signal given by the plaintiff (R. 148, 149). As the car on
which the plaintiff was riding neared the derail, located on
the stock or ice house track some 144 feet north of the main
street crossing, plaintiff according to his testimony moved
forward on the roof of the car he was riding, preparatory
to climbing down the west or right side ladder located at
the forward end of the car (R. 153). Plaintiff claimed that
as he was in the act of crouching to descend the ladder there
was severe slack action in the train (R. 184), which dislodged him from the car and caused him to fall to the
ground (R. 150). His right arm was run over by the car
wheels (R. 150). Thereafter, he was rushed to the hospital at Salida, Colorado, where his arm was amputated
five inches below the shoulder (R. 229).
At the trial, the plaintiff produced as his witness on
the issue of damages a Mr. Ray G. Wood. Since defendant
predicates several assignments of error on the basis of Mr.
Wood's testimony, it is herein set forth in some detail. Mr.
Wood was a partner in a firm of certified public accountants in Salt Lake City. He had majored in accounting and
received a Bachelor of Science degree from the University
of Utah. He had been in practice as an accountant for about
twenty-five years (R. 235). The witness stated that he was
not and didn't pretend to be an actuary (R. 239) . An
actuary was a person employed by an insurance company
to make such computations as an insurance company uses.
An important part of the work of an actuary consists in
computing annuities (R. 239). Mr. Wood had brought to
court with him the written document Exhibit G (R. 2'35).
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He was a frequent witness for Mr. Black in railroad cases
(R. 275), and on numerous occasions in the past had prepared exhibits similar to Exhibit G (R. 246). His employment in this capacity was profitable (R. 275).
According to Mr. Wood, Exhibit G contained computations of the present value of various monthly annuities at
stipulated rates of interest for 457 monthly periods (R. 238).
In the preparation of Exhibit G, a portion of the information contained ~in the American Experience Table of Mortality had been used (R. 236). Reference also had been
made to some mathematical tables and formulas contained
in a certain book ( R. 242-243, 249) . In addition, certain
mathematical calculations had been made because the tables
and formulas in the book extended only to 360 periods,
whereas Exhibit G covered 457 periods (R. 250, 257-258).
Exhibit G consisted of computations based upon an appl,ication and combination of these three separate sources of information.
The American Experience Table of Mortality had been
referred to in the preparation of Exhibit G, in order to
ascertain the life expectancy of an individual twenty-six
years of age (R. 236-23'7). This life expectancy table was
included in the state statutes, Volume 6. Mr. Wood had not
personally looked up the figure or checked it, but some other
person in his office had secured the information (R. 240).
Over the defendant's objection, Mr. Wood then was permitted to testify that the life expectancy figure indicated
for a person twenty-six years of age was 38.12 years or 457
months ( R. 2'37) . The American Experience Table of Mortality consisted, in part, of a table which showed the mor-
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tality experience of major insurance companies in the
United States and the future life expectancy of a person
at a certain attained age (R. 236). It was based only upon
people who were considered insurable risks by insurance
companies (R. 280). 'Vith reference to any particular individual, the life expectancy table was purely a matter of
speculation (R. 278). It did not take into consideration an
individual's occupational·hazards (R. 278), or the fact that
railroad men were "rated up" or given a much higher
mortality rating than ordinary occupations (R. 278).
After somebody had told Mr. Wood what the life expectancy was for a person twenty-six years of age, reference then had been made to certain mathematical tables and
formulas contained in some book (R. 242). While on the
stand during the morning session of the court, the witness
stated that he had forgotten the name of the author of the
book, but he believed it was published by an outfit in
Boston, the Century Publishing Company (R. 243). It was
hard to say what the mathematical tables in the book did
reflect; they were a mass of arithmetical calculations (R.
242). The book also contained various tables, interest rates
and annuity computations (R. 243). The book made the
calculations in certain formulas. The book was used because
it was economical in time to do so (R. 249). It was a
"standard" book used by accountants and investment houses
in the computation of bond and interest rates and all that
sort of thing (R. 246). The defendant moved to strike the
latter statement as a mere conclusion and as hearsay, but
the trial court denied the motion ( R. 246) .
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After the noon recess, the court permitted further
testimony from the witness Wood. At that time Mr. Wood
had with him the book or books to which he previously had
referred (R. 256). The book was entitled "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables," and was published
by the Financial Publishing Company. Also, Mr. Wood had
checked with the First Security Trust Company and had
found that the book was used by that institution (R. 2·56),
but for what purpose the witness did not state. Although
specifically asked by plaintiff's counsel to do so, he could
name no other trust company, bank, or any one else in Salt
Lake City who used the book as a "standard" work (R.
2·56) . During the noon recess Mr. Wood had spot checked
the tables in the book against the tables in another book entitled "Mathematics of Finance" by McKenzie. The mathematical formulas in both books were in agreement (R. 2'57).
He also. had compared during the noon recess some of the
tables in the book "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity '~a:bles" with the "Accountant's Handbook," and the
tables in both books were the same (R. 260). The book
"Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables" was
published in 1942. According to the fly leaf, it was prepared "under editorial supervision," but Mr. Wood didn't
know who actually had prepared the tables (R. 259). He did
not know whether or not the 'American Institute of Accountants had approved the book (R. 260). He did not ~ow
whether or not any actuarial societies had approved the
book or the tables and formulas contained therein (R. 261).
Then under leading questions put by the trial judge, the
witness stated the conclusion that the book "Financial Com-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

::

7
pound Interest and Annuity Tables" and the book "Mathematics of Finance" were "standard works" accepted by the
people in his profession (R. 267). In the preparation of Exhibit G, Mr. Wood had taken from the book "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables" certain information
from the table on the present worth of one dollar per period.
He had used the interest rate figures of 2%, 3, and one other
figure (R. 262).
In addition to the information taken from the life
expectancy chart of the American Experience Table of
Mortality and the information taken from the book "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables," a third source
of information was used in the preparation of Exhibit G.
This consisted of certain calculations made in Mr. Wood's
office and based in part upon formulas contained in the book
"Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables." In the
book the tables only extended to 360 periods, whereas Exhibit G was based upon 457 periods. So it was necessary to
calculate to 457 periods above the 3~60 periods in the book
(R. 258). That was what Mr. Wood meant when he said
that the figures used on Exhibit G did not appear in the
book; the book didn't go high enough. In calculating to 457
periods, however, the formulas were taken from the book
(R. 250). The witness Wood had proved some of the figures
in the book to his satisfaction (R. 249-250). But he had
not checked the tables in the two books referred to, against
the figures and computations on Exhibit G. He had taken
other amounts that appeared in the book because the figures
on Exhibit G were complicated (R. 257). Moreover, he had
not made any independent calculation to verify the accuracy
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the figures on Exhibit G (R. 265) . He had made a calculation of figures of smaller denomination that were easier
to figure (R. 26·5). He never had taken any of the figures
on Exhibit G and worked them out mathematically, without
reliance upon the formulas contained in the book (R. 266).
The witness declined to step to the blackboard in the court
room and independently of any tables compute the present
value of an annuity of $1 per month at 2%L% for a life expectancy of 38.12 years; he said that he could do it, but it
would take him a month to work it out (R. 265-266, 275).
The contents of Exhibit G apparently were computed
by combining and applying the information from the three
sources above stated. The computations were made in Mr.
Wood's office (R. 245). The.figures on Exhibit G were not
personally checked by Mr. Wood (R. 246-247). Nor was
there any testimony that the figures were computed or
checked under his supervision or direction.
In making the computations on Exhibit G, the interest
was compounded monthly, not annually (R. 2612). When annuities were calculated by an actuary, the interest was compounded on an annual basis. Mr. Wood knew that the compounding of interest annually was the usual basis for such
a computation (R. 262), nevertheless he computed it on a
monthly basis (R. 263). Furthermore, Exhibit G was computed by taking a flat life expectancy figure. Mr. Wood
stated he didn't know whether the computation of an annuity upon a flat life expectancy basis was expressly disapproved by actuaries or not (R. 279). The complete American Experience Table of Mortality, as distinguished from
the partial table set forth in the state statutes, indicated
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for a particular age group how many persons of that group
died during each year and how many continued to live (R.
240-241) . It was possible to compute annuities on the basis
of such detailed information, rather than on the basis of the
flat average shown by the life expectancy chart (R. 241242). Exhibit G, however, was computed on the basis of the
flat life expectancy figure, rather than by using the complete American Experience Table (R. 242).

·-

=-··

The basic assumption of Exhibit G, so far as its application to a particular individual, was that the same conditions would obtain constantly throughout the entire period
contemplated by the exhibit (R. 276). If the earning capacity of a person should increase at any time during the
period, it would not be reflected in Exhibit G (R. 277). If
an insurance actuary were computing annuities, consideration would be given to the particular occupation and occupational hazards of the individual (R. 278), and railroad men
would be given a higher mortality rating (R. 278). It also
could be said of Exhibit G that it did not take into consideration such factors as sickness, disability, vacations, and the
like, which affect the earnings of an employee (R. 278279). Neither did Exhibit G take into consideration the
possibility of retirement, which for most railroad employees
occurred around sixty-five years of age (R. 279). Nor did
Exhibit G take into consideration state and federal taxes
deducted from the incomes of most of us (R. 279). Exhibit G gave no consideration to any of these factors (R.
278) . Many of these factors could be included in Exhibit
G, by a proper actuarial computation (R. 279). In response
to leading questions by plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Wood several
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
times asserted that the computations on Exhibit G were
mathematically correct (R. 238, 244, 246, 258).
At several points during the examination of Mr. Wood,
the defendant made objections not only to the materiality
of his testimony (R. 237, 238), but particularly to the introduction in evidence of Exhibit G and of the contents
thereof (R. 243, 267). Specific objections were made to
the admission of the evidence upon the grounds : that Exhibit G admittedly was based upon information and data not
before the court; that it was hearsay; that there was no
sufficient showing that the material and data upon which
Exhibit G was based was generally recognized or accepted
as competent for the purpose for which it apparently had
been used (R. 243, 244-251); that there was no proper
foundation for the admission in evidence of Exhibit G;
also that Exhibit G was inadmissible because it affirmatively appeared from the testimony that the witness had not
checked the accuracy of the computations therein (R. 267).
At the conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Wood at the morning session of court, the trial judge sustained the defendant's
objections. At the afternoon session, however, after the
witness had brought into the court room a book or books
from which he claimed to have taken part of the information included in Exhibit G, and after the witness had testified in answer to leading questions by the trial judge that
the books were "standard" (R. 267), the trial court reversed
its prior decision, overruled the defendant's objections and
permitted Exhibit G to be introduced in evidence (R. 268).
After the introduction in evidence of Exhibit G, the witness
Wood then was permitted to step down in front of the jury,
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11
display the exhibit, and explain its contents (R. 270~271),
notwithstanding the defendant's objection that the written
document spoke for itself without the necessity of further
stating its contents to the jury (R. 269-270).
By means of the witness Wood, the plaintiff also sought
to introduce in evidence Exhibit H. Exhibit H apparently
was the same type exhibit as Exhibit G, except that instead of using the life expectancy averages of the Am~rican
Experience Table of Mortality, the so-called United States
Life Table, 1939-1941, Department of Commerce was consulted. The latter document seemingly indicated higher expectancy figures than shown by the American Experience
Table. Otherwise, the same sources of information were
used in preparing Exhibit H as were used in preparing Exhibit G (R. 272, 274-275). It was Mr. Wood's "understanding" that the United States Life Table was prepared by the
Department of Commerce (R. 271). He had obtained his
copy several years previous and had possessed it several
years (R. 273). He did not know whether or not the table
was used by insurance actuaries ( R. 273) . He didn't. think
the table was recognized by the statutes of the State of
Utah (R. 273). No one that the witness knew, nor any company in the State of Utah, used the so-called United States
Life Table. It was used for purposes of comparison (R.
273). Mr. Wood further stated that according to "the explanation of the table" (R. 272) it was broken down into
divisions for white males and white females, and similar
divisions for colored persons. It included citizens of every
kind and all professions and occupations (R. 271-272). The
table indicated that a white male, age twenty-six, had an
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expectancy of 42.38 years or 509 months (R. 272). Also,
Exhibit H was mathematically correct (R. 272).
Upon the basis of the foregoing testimony, Exhibit
H then was offered in evidence. Defendant objected upon
the grounds that insufficient foundation had been laid for
the introduction of the exhibit; that there had been no
proper authentication of the so-called United States Life
Table, and that there was no evidence that these tables had
any general recognition in the State of Utah, or among insurance companies, actuaries, accounting systems, or any
other such institutions ( R. 273-27 4). But the trial court
overruled the objection and admitted Exhibit H in evidence
(R. 274).
Various other incidents which occurred during the trial
and certain other portions of the testimony adduced are set
forth herein under subdivision III of defendant's argument,
pertaining to the excessive verdict awarded by the jury.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
1. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence plaintiff's Exhibit G, also in admitting certain testimony in connection therewith, for the reason that said exhibit and testimony were not properly authenticated and were based upon
hearsay and second hand information, also for the reason
that Exhibit G and similar such exhibits are immaterial and
incompetent for any purpose.
2. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence plaintiff's Exhibit H, for the reason that said exhibit was based
in part upon information in the so-called United States Life
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Table, which was never introduced in evidence or in any
manner qualified by proper preliminary proof with respect
to authenticity and accuracy.
3. The trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial, in view of the excessive
verdict returned by the jury under the influence of passion
and prejudice engendered by the admission of improper
testimony and by a series of prejudicial incidents occurring
during the trial.
ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE PLAINT'IF'F'S
EXHIBIT G, ALSO IN ADMITTING CERTAIN ORAL
TESTIMONY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH.
It is apparent from the testimony of the plaintiff's
alleged expert witness, Mr. Ray G. Wood, that the written
document Exhibit G consisted of computations based upon
data derived from three separate sources, as follows:
1. Certain information apparently taken from

the life expectancy chart of the American Experience
Table of Mortality.
2. Certain information claimed to have been
taken from tables and formulas contained in a book
entitled "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity
Tables."
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3. Certain information claimed to have been
calculated in the office of Mr. Wood, and based in
part upon ·formulas contained in the above mentioned book.
With reference to the first source of information,
namely, the life expectancy chart of the American Experience Table of Mortality, no part of this table was introduced
in evidence or in any manner produced before the trial
court. The testimony of Mr. Wood as to what the table disclosed concerning the life expectancy of a person twenty-six
years of age was mere hearsay; it was not the best evidence.
Mr. Wood admitted that he had not personally looked up the
information in the American Experience Table, nor had he
checked it. Some other undisclosed person in his office had
secured the information (R. 240). So far as Mr. Wood,
himself, was concerned, the information to which he testified was second hand. So far as the court and jury in
this case were concerned, the information was third hand.

It is sometimes said that a court may take judicial
notice of standard, recognized mortality tables. And it may
be assumed that the life expectancy chart of the American
Experience Table of Mortality, which is set forth in Volume
6 of the Utah Code Annotated (1943), is such a standard,
recognized table. Before judicial notice can be taken of
such an evidentiary fact, however, a proper request for
such dispensation must be made to the court. Wigmore on
Evidence, Third Edition, Sec. 2568. Thereafter the trial
court must declare the fact as established to the jury. Utah
Code Annotated (1943), Sec. 104-5~4-4. No such procedure
was followed in the instant case.
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Although standard mortality tables are at times
"judicially noticed," strictly speaking they are evidence admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Wigmore
on Evidence, Third Edition, Sec. 2566 ( 4) Note 7; Western
& A. R. Co. v. Hyer, 113 Ga. 776, 34 S. E. 446. Again, assuming that the American Experience Table of Mortality
as a standard, recognized table would be admissible in evidence upon a proper offer and request for its admission,
not even a feeble attempt to follow such procedure was made
in the instant case. Instead, over the specific and timely
objection of the defendant (R. 237), the witness Wood was
permitted to give third hand testimony as to the contents of
a table which was in no manner before the court. Similar
testimony was held reversible error in Erb v. Popritz, 5·9
Kan. 264, 52 P. 871, 873, in which the court stated:
"Objection is also made to the testimony of a
witness as to the expectancy of life of the deceased.
Instead o~ offering standard life tables, showing
the probable duration of life, the witness was allowed to state his recollection of what the tables
showed. He was engaged in the insurance business,
and claimed to be acquainted with the mortality
tables used by life insurance companies. Among
others, he stated that he had knowledge of the
Actuaries, Carlysle, and the American, but, instead
of submitting the tables, he undertook to give the
expectancy of life of one as old as Popritz was at the
time of his death. The witness was not a physician,
and had no special qualifications which enabled him
to determine the probable duration of Popritz's life,
but depended entirely upon such information as he
had acquired from standard tables which he
happened to have consulted in connection with the
insurance business. Where recovery is sought in
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cases of death or permanent InJury, standard life
tables may be introduced to show the probable duration of life of one injured or killed, but the statements of one who has no knowledge upon the subject,
except such as he may have gained from consulting
such tables, is not the best evidence."
The second source of material in Exhibit G consisted
of the claimed use of tables and formulas contained in a
book tardily identified as "Financial Compound Interest
and Annuity Tables." Obviously, the testimony of the witness Wood with respect to the 'contents of this book likewise
was mere hearsay. At the outset of his testimony, the book
referred to could not even be identified by the witness (R.
243). Later, after the noon recess of court, the book was
brought into the court room and identified merely as to title
and publisher (R. 256). Then under leading questions propounded by the trial judge, the witness was permitted to
state the conclusion that the book was "standard" and accepted as such by the people in his profession. Thereupon,
the trial court allowed the testimony of the witness with
respect to certain information claimed to have been taken
from the book and included in Exhibit G, and also admitted
in evidence Exhibit G (R. 268).
In the first place, the trial court clearly erred in admitting in evidence information and data taken from the
book "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables,"
without the book itself first being offered and admitted.
Under the circumstances, testimony out of the mouth of
Wood concerning data allegedly taken from the book was
not the best evidence. It was purely hearsay, and in turn was
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based upon a publication which itself was hearsay. Certainly, the contents of the book did not prove themselves.
Dallas Railzcay & Te·rminal Co. v. Guthrie, (Sup. Ct. Tex.)
210 s. w. (2d) 550, 551.
If the book or portions thereof had been offered in
evidence, they would have been admissible like any other
writings, upon proper foundation and preliminary proof
with respect to authenticity and accuracy. Absent such
proof, the book and its contents were meaningless. As distinguished from the American Experience Table of Mortality, given recognition as a standard authority by virtue of
its inclusion in the State Code, there is nothing about the
book "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables"
which entitles it to general recognition as a standard work
for the purpose of actuarial calculations, without the necessity of proper foundation and preliminary proof. This
principle is elementary in its application to any written
document, whether public or private. See for example, Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co. v. Patterson (App. Ga.), 43 S. E. (2d)
177, 181 (report of U.S. Department of Commerce, Weather
Bureau, excluded from evidence because no proper foundation had been laid for its introduction; no identification or
authentication) ; Brown v. Republic Casualty & Surety Co.,
(App. Mo.) 31 S. W. (2d) 111 ("Red Book" showing average price of second hand automobiles held inadmissible) ;
Lusardi v. Prukop, 116 ·Cal. App. 506, 2 P. (2d) 870 (hospital records and testimony based on memoranda by others
held inadmissible); United States v. Timmons, 68 F. (2d)
654 (C. 'C. A. 5) (report by a government physician of a
physical examination of a veteran at Veterans Bureau exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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eluded because not properly authenticated) ; Powell v. Anderson, 147 Neb. 872, 2·5 N. W. (2d) 401 (an unsigned and
unauthenticated copy of an 0. P. A. order, produced from
the files of such agency, held secondary evidence and inadmissible); United States v. Chandler, 87 F. (2d) 3S6 (C.
C. A. 5) (government hospital records held admissible, if
properly authenticated) ; Rea v. Simowitz, 225 N. C. 575,
35 S. E. ( 2'd) 871 (a non-statutory mortality table is admissible, but must be identified and properly authenticated) ;
Gaines v. Standard Accident Insurance Co. (La. App.) 32
So. (2d) 633, (tables prepared by insurance companies showing the distance required to bring vehicles to a stop under
certain conditions held inadmissible, without authentication and proof of accuracy) .
1

In the case at bar, there was a complete lack of preliminary proof with respect to the accuracy and authenticity
of the book "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity
Tables." The closest approach to any such evidence was the
witness's conclusion that the book was "standard" in his
profession, in answer to the leading question propounded
by the trial court (R. 267). This "conclusion" is valueless,
however, when considered in the light of the other testimony
by the same witness. Mr. Wood stated that he had checked
with only. one institution in Salt Lake City to find out
whether the book was in use, to wit, the First Security Trust
Company. That institution used the book (R. 2156), but for
what purpose was left unstated. He could name no other
trust company, bank, or any one else in Salt Lake City, who
used ·the book, though specifically so questioned by plaintiff's counsel (R. 25·6). Neither did he know whether or
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not the American Institute of Accountants or any actuarial
society ever had approved the book (R. 26·0-261). Also, he
admitted that he never had checked the tables in the book,
against the particular figures and computations used in
Exhibit G (R. 257). Both plaintiff's counsel and the trial
court erroneously assumed that the test of the authenticity
of the tables and formulas in the book was whether the book
was considered "standard" by accountants and whether it
was used by banks or trust companies to compute bond and
interest rates (R. 246). But the true and very minimum
test of the authenticity of the book and of the tables and
formulas contained therein, when used for the purpose of
computing the present value of annuities, would be whether
the book was generally recognized as standard, accurate,
and authentic by insurance companies, actuaries and others
whose particular business it was to compute annuities. The
record in the present case is completely devoid of any such
evidence. The witness Wood was an accountant (R. 235).
He was not and didn't pretend to be an actuary (R. 239).
His testimony failed to indicate that he had any knowledge
or qualifications as an expert on annuities or that he had
any familiarity with actuarial data or methods of calculation. In no sense, therefore, was he even qualified to authenticate the book or the other actuarial materials in question.
The third source of information for Exhibit G consisted of certain mathematical calculations claimed to have
been necessary because the tables and formulas in the book
"Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables" extended only to 360 periods whereas Exhibit G contemplated
457 periods (R. 250, 257-258). These particular matheSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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matical calculations supposedly were made in Mr. Wood's
office by some unidentified person. They were based in
part upon formulas contained in the aforementioned book.
Just what these formulas were and how the calculations
were made the witness at no time stated. The foregoing
calculations are, of course, subject to the same infirmities
as admissible evidence, as the other tables and formulas taken from the book and heretofore discussed. In addition, this
particular evidence is subject to still another criticism. For
if these particular mathematical calculations were, in part,
the basis of the further computations set forth on Exhibit
G, certainly there should have been some preliminary evidence with respect to the identity of the person who did the
calculating, his qualifications, and the accuracy of the calculations. As the record stands, no such preliminary proof
was offered. All that is known is that the computations
were·made in Mr. Wood's office. Wood, himself, had not
personally checked the calculations (R. 246-247) and there
was no evidence that they had been prepared or checked
under his supervision or direction. The witness had made
no independent calculations to verify the accuracy of the
figures on Exhibit G (R. 2'65), although he had made calculations of figures of smaller denominations that were easier
to figure ( R. 265) . He had never taken any of the figures
and worked them out mathematically, without reliance upon
the formulas in the book (R. 266). When askeq to do so in
open court and demonstrate it to the jury, he said it could
be done, but it would take him a month to work it out (R.
265-266, 275). In the light of the foregoing testimony, the
witness's repeated assertions that Exhibit G itself was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
mathematically correct means nothing. The pertinent fact
is there was no evidence at all of the accuracy of the particular calculations upon which the further computations
on Exhibit G were based.
After the data for Exhibit G had been secured from the
three different sources above outlined, Exhibit G was devised. This consisted of further computations based upon
an application and combination of the information gathered
from the three sources indicated. But what these further
computations consisted of, or just what methods were applied, or how it was accomplished is left to the imagination.

,._
.....

For the several reasons herein set forth, based upon
the specific objections made by defendant throughout the
testimony of the witness Wood, it is submitted that the trial
court grievously erred in admitting Exhibit G. Although
the use and admissibility of exhibits such as Exhibit G
several times before has been considered by this Court, in no
previous case so far as the defendant is aware, have the
separate components which make up the exhibit been analyzed by the testimony produced at the trial and timely
objection made thereto.

-:;_.r;

In addition to the particular objections to Exhibit G
above set forth, the defendant also submits that the use and
admissibility of all exhibits such as Exhibit G should be
barred in the courts of this jurisdiction, on the general
ground of their immateriality and incompetency. This, for
the reason that experience has taught that their tendency
is to confuse and mislead, rather than enlighten the jury;
that they are misused by juries as mere time tables in order
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to calculate large and unreasonable verdicts, and that the
consistent injustice caused by their use overbalances any
supposed value they may possess. The defendant is not unaware, of course, that in Bruner v. McCarth!y, 105 Utah
399, 142 P. (2d) 649, 6!56, this Court approved the use
of an exhibit apparently somewhat similar to Exhibit Gin
this case. But in Pauly v. McCarthy, 109' Utah 431,
184 P. (2d) 123, although the use of such an exhibit was
approved, the Court took pains to restrict the use to cases
"where the injury alleged and proved is permanent, and is
of such nature as to indicate a permanent material impairment of a substantial nature in the earning capacity of the
plaintiff * * *." Again, in Schlatter v. McCarthy,
... Utah ... , 196 P. (2d) 9-68, 973, 974, the Court took
occasion to reiterate the limitation imposed upon the use
of the exhibit in the Pauly case, and made the further observation that the Court's experience with such exhibits
had taught that they were "not an unmixed blessing." The
Court further stated that its experience had shown that to
"a certain extent they tend to mislead the jury. In using
these tables, juries tend to select an amount shown on the
table, very close to the average monthly wages of plaintiff
at the time of his injury or death, and then to read the table
like a time table. * * * The obvious vice of this procedure is that the jury fails to take into consideration the
possibility of loss of future wages due to sickness, injuries,
strikes or other causes, the probability that the employee
will retire from active service before his death, and the
almost certainty that with advancing age his earning capacity will decrease."
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Interestingly enough, this Court was not the first to
recognize the "obvious vice" of such exhibits. As early as
1926, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a careful
opinion by Chief Justice Moschzisker in McCaffrey v.
Swartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 A. 810, 813, considered and rejected the use of the so-called present worth tables in view
of that court's experience that "their presence almost inevitably tend to their misuse." In the course of its opinion,
the court said :
"We shall now consider subdivision (c) of the
third question involved, which has to do with the
admissibility in evidence of tables showing the present worth of a dollar payable at a fixed date in the
future. First, it must be understood that direct application of annuity tables-calculated, as they are,
on the basis of a constant annual amount-is never
permissible in cases of the present type, because, if
this course were pursued, the gradual decline in the
average man's earning capacity toward the end of
his days would make the result inaccurate in any
given case. Present value tables have been held admissible only to show the proportionate relation between payments which would ordinarily be made in
the future and a lump sum to be awarded at once as
compensation for their loss. rcitations.] The purpose of admitting such tables has been to aid the
jurors in making calculations they would otherwise
have to figure out for themselves; but compensation for pecuniary loss is not to be arrived at by
arithmetical processes alone, for it cannot be said
that, the amount of the income being known, the loss
is reduaed to a mere matter of calculation, the nature of the income previously enjoyed by the person
involved, and the probabilities of its continuance
according to the particular circumstances on which
it depends must be considered.
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"In a case like the one at bar, plaintiff is no
necessarily entitled to receive a perpetual annui~
calculated on his loss of income from the date of th
accident, for it is possible that, without regard to th1
effect of the accident in question, he might be dis
abled by illness, natural decline or other causes fron
continuing to earn the income he had before his in
jury. After taking into account the income itself
the circumstances under which it was earned b~
plaintiff, and all factors affecting the likelihood o1
its continuance, increase, or diminution, as unaffected by the accident, the jurors are to say what, in
their opinion, is fair compensation for the impairment of earning power, whether permanent or temporary, under which plaintiff suffers because of the
accident; and in order to work justice, the jury
would have to understand that present value tables
could not be applied until the probable expectancy
of the life in question had been decided and the
amounts of future yearly losses determined. As
pointed out earlier in this opinion, such losses are
those due to diminution of earning power, and, as
before indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph, usually a time arrives toward the end of the
average man's life when his earning power becomes
less and less ; in other words, the sums or losses to
be decided on and reduced to their present value are
variable in that, after a certain time, to be determined in every case by the jury, the annual earnings generally become smaller each year. To expect
a jury to determine these dates and amounts, and
then to apply the tables and reach present values,
is to expect the impossible, as long experience has
shown. The question is, What, in the light of this
experience, should now be held as to the admissibility of such tables at a jury trial? Do they in fact
aid the jury to make proper calculations, or does their
presence almost inevitably tend to their misuse, or,
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in other words, to the direct application of them as
though they were annuity tables? We are unanimously forced to the latter conclusion. This being so, we
take advantage of the instant case--where we have
been materially aided by the researches and the
arguments of able counsel, who considered all phases
of the matter of proper evidence of future losses connected with impairment of earning power-to say
that the present worth tables should not be admitted
at jury trials."

The vice of Exhibit G in the instant case is demon'"' strated not only by the testimony heretofore analyzed con.. cerning the components upon which the exhibit was claimed
=~: to be based, but also by the general observations of the
witness Wood, himself, regarding the exhibit. He conceded
....!.
-· that the accuracy of the figures on Exhibit G was not per.· sonally checked by him (R. 246-247). Nor was there any ·
- evidence that the figures were checked by anyone under his
~
supervision. In making the computations on the exhibit,
::; the interest was compounded monthly, not annually (R.
1 262), even though Mr. Wood admitted that he l<:new the
:::: usual basis for such a computation by an actuary involved
~;
_ the compounding of interest annually (R. 262). Also, the
annuities on Exhibit G were computed by taking a flat life
::.: expectancy figure, even though it was possible to compute
them on the basis of the detailed information set forth in
; the complete American Experience Table (R. 240-2421). Mr.
:-:...: Wood did not know whether the computation of annuities
, upon a flat life expectancy basis was or was not approved
;/ by actuaries (R. 279). Moreover, the witness conceded
~l that the basic assumption of Exhibit G, was the obviously .
6t
rrJ false assumption, that the same conditions with respect to
~~
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the earning power of the plaintiff and all other relevant factors, would obtain constantly throughout the entire period
contemplated by the exhibit (R. 276). Exhibit G gave no
consideration to the well known fact that railroad employees
have a higher than average mortality rating (R. 278) ; also
that the life-span earnings of an employee would be materially affected by such factors as sickness, temporary disabilities, vacations, and similar factors (R. 278-279). Neither did
Exhibit G take into consideration the fact of retirement under a pension plan arrangement which for most railroad
employees occured at about 65 years of age (R. 279); nor
the fact that no deductions for state or federal taxes were
made in connection with the exhibit (R. 279). Still other
factors to be considered were suggested in the opinion of this
Court in Schlatter v. McCarthy, supra. The witness Wood
admitted that many of these factors could have been included
in Exhibit G by a proper actuarial computation (R. 279).
The misuse of Exhibit G as a time table for measuring
damages in cases such as the present one, is further aggravated by the customary procedure by which such exhibits
are presented in the trial court. The procedure followed
provides for an undue repetition and emphasis to the jury
of the same evidence. The present case illustrates this point.
First, the witness Wood took the witness stand, and in the
course of his examination and over the specific objection of
the defendant (R. 238) was permitted to state in a general
way the contents of Exhibit G (R. 238). Secondly, the witness was allowed to step down in front of the jury, display
the exhibit, and again state its contents, notwithstanding
the defendant's specific objection that the written docu-
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ment spoke for itself without the necessity of repeating its
contents to the jury (R. 269-270). Third, the exhibit was
introduced and the jurors permitted to examine it individually. Fourth, the jurors were permitted to take the ex. hibit with them to the jury room, for use as .a time table in
the computation of a verdict.

-

Under what theory of law or common sense and fair
play, is this second hand, hearsay collection of unproved
possibilities and supposed probabilities entitled to such
undue emphasis? Would the same rule which sanctions this
procedure likewise permit the defendant to reduce to written form the testimony of one of its favorable witnesses,
have the contents of the purported written document orally
stated several times to the jury in open court, and then have
the document taken to the jury room for the jury to further
ponder upon? Of course, if the defendant even should attempt such procedure it would be subject to severe censure,
and rightly so. But what is the essential distinction between
such a procedure and the use permitted the plaintiff of Exhibit G?
II

- THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF'S
,- EXHIBIT H, ALSO IN A:DMITTING CERT AIN TES::CTIMONY UPON WHICH EXHIBIT H PURPORTEDLY
.
l~ WAS B~SED.
1

~

The trial court admitted in evidence plaintiff's Exhibit
, H, following the admission of Exhibit G (R. 274). Exhibit
H was the same tYPe of an exhibit as Exhibit G. The witness

;:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
Wood, through whom Exhibit H was introduced, stated
that except for consulting the so-called United States Life
Table in place of the American Experience Table, Exhibit
H was based upon the same sources of information as Exhibit G (R. 272, 27 4-275). The data claimed to have been
taken from the so-called United States Life Table showed
a substantially longer life expectancy period than the comparable figure from the American .Experience Table. A comparison of Exhibits G and H will reveal that the higher expectancy figure used in computing Exhibit H, resulted in
much larger present worth figures for the monthly annuities stated. For example, the indicated present value of
a monthly annuity of $200 at 23)b% on Exhibit G is $54,613.17, whereas the comparable figure on Exhibit H is
$,60,0S3. 71 ~a difference in round figures of about $5,500.
All of the objections and arguments heretofore urged
against the admissibility of Exhibit G are equally applicable
to Exhibit H. In addition, the defendant makes a further
contention with respect to the admission of Exhibit H, to
the extent that it was based upon information claimed
to have been contained in the so-called United States
Life Tables. This supposed document or publi-cation, if
it in f act exists, was never produced in open court or in
any manner directed to the attention of the trial court.
The only information concerning the alleged document
came from the recollection of the witness Wood. Here
again, the proper procedure would have been to have
offered and introduced in evidence, after proper foundation and preliminary proof, the fundamental data upon
which Exhibit H was b~sed, including the so-called
1
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United States Life Table. Since the alleged table, itself,
neither was produced nor offered in evidence and since the
court permitted secondary evidence concerning statistics
taken therefrom, certainly the minimum requirement would
consist of some substantial evidence regarding the
authenticity and recognition of the purported table for the
purposes for which it apparently was used. Otherwise,
testimony concerning the contents of the so-called United
States Life Table, supposedly incorporated in Exhibit H, was
wholly without reliability or materiality.
The necessity of preliminary proof of the authenticity
and accuracy of a non-statutory mortality is well established. Rea v. Simowitz, 225 N. C. 575, 35 S. E. (2d) 871;
Hampton v. Penn. R. Co. (App. N. J.) 179 A. 101; Banks
v. Braman (Sup. Ct. Mass.) 80 N. E. 799; McKenna v.
Citizens Natural Gas Co. (Sup. Ct. Penn.) 47 A. 990, 991;
Notto v. Atlantic City R. Co. (App. N. J.) 69 A. 9'68; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. (Sup. Ct. Tex.) 17 S. W. 4'7, 50.
An examination of the court's opinions in several of the
cited cases, reveals almost identical analogies to the situation in the case at bar.

Banks v. Braman, supra, was an action for personal
injuries received in an automobile accident. The plaintiff
offered in evidence and the trial court excluded a certain
table purporting to show life expectancies according to the
Actuaries' Combined Experience. Plaintiff excepted to
this ruling, and upon appeal the ruling of the lower court
was sustained. The Massachusetts Supreme Court said:
"Under the plaintiff's claim that the injury to
his back was permanent it was proper, if not necesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sary, for the jury in estimating the amount of compensation to take into consideration the probable
duration of his life; and on that question there can
be no doubt that standard mortality or life expectancy tables would have been admissible. * * *
"In this case a medical witness for the defendant had before him a 'book on life insurance,' and
turned to a 'table showing the expectancy of life for
each year, from 15 to 85, according to the actuaries'
combined experience.' When asked how such tables
were 'gotten up,' he replied: 'They are gotten up by
the actuaries of these companies, put into tables;
indicates at each age the expectancy of life at that
particular age.' Upon further inquiry, however, it
appeared that the witness had no other information
as to the authenticity of the table than that contained in the book, or, in other words, that he was
stating simply what upon its face this table appeared
to be. The table was excluded. Under these circumstances it does not appear that the exclusion of the
book was error. It does not appear that the table was
in any respect a standard table or that it was well
established or recognized authority, or even that
it was in general use by life insurance companies.
The judge well might have concluded upon the evidence before him that the table was not sufficiently
authenticated, and we cannot say that such a conclusion was not warranted. In such a case he could
rightly exclude it."

McKenna v. Citizens' Natural Gas Co., supra, was a
suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by
plaintiff and his wife in an explosion. After judgment for
plaintiff, defendant appealed assigning as error, among
other points, the reception in evidence of certain testimony
concerning the life expectancy of the plaintiff and his wife.
The court said:
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"The first and second assignments of error relate to the reception of the testimony of Samuel
Henry, offered for the purpose of showing the expectancy of the lives of Patrick Henry McKenna and
Mary McKenna, his wife. He testified from a life
table in a book entitled 'Handy Guide to Premium
Rates, Applications, and Policies of American Life
Insurance Companies.' The book was not offered in
evidence, and all we know of it is what the witness
testified to. It contained two mortality tables. In
testifying to the expectancy of life, he read from the
one designated 'Combined Actuaries Experience'
table. On what this table is based, or from what material it was constructed, is not disclosed by the evidence. Whether it was founded on selected or insurable lives, or upon general population, or upon
either, is not shown by the testimony. The character
of the table, and its value as a basis from which
to determine the expectancy of life, were not shown.
The witness testified that the table was used for
ascertaining rates, and that from this table he could
calculate the expectancy of life at a given age. The
competency of the witness and the weight of his
testimony depended entirely upon the value of the
table as evidence to establish the expectancy of life.
Had the table itself been offered, under the facts
disclosed at the trial it would have been rejected.
The witness, therefore, should not have been permitted to testify from it to the expectancy of life
of the plaintiff and his wife. * * *"
In Notto v. Atlantic City R. Co., supra, the court stated:

-:

"The only assignment of error that we think
we need consider is 'that which challenges the admission in evidence of volume 20 of the American &
English Encyclopaedia of Law to prove the Carlisle
Mortality Tables.
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"That mortality tables are admissible in a proper
case has been decided by this court. Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co. v. Williams, 61 N. J. Law, 646, 40
Atl. 634. We there said that the authenticity of the
paper produced as the table should be established
by proof satisfactory to the court, as by the testimony
of a witness familiar with it and with its use, and
that its office and use should be explained by a
competent witness.
"The only proof in this case was by the testimony of one of the counsel for the plaintiff, who
produced the volume of the Encyclopaedia and testified that the tables represented the reasonable expectancy of life as shown from the experience
gathered by insurance companies in America and
England, and was known as the 'Carlisle Table.'
Upon cross-examination he said he knew nothing
other than what he saw in the book, and had not
compared the table there given with a table recognized and established as the Carlisle Table. There was
no preliminary proof as to his knowledge or use of
the Carlisle Table, and we cannot assume that a
lawyer is necessarily competent to testify as to the
accuracy of a mortality table. That he was not
familiar with the subject seems to be fairly inferable
from his statement that the Carlisle Table is based
on American as well as English experience. His
knowledge of the character of the table was derived
from what appeared on its face, and it did not purport to be the Carlisle Table, but a table based on
American experience.
"We do not doubt that cases may arise in which
the court will take judicial notice of the accuracy of
mortality tables. They may be found in books in
constant use by the courts for making calculations
necessary to ascertain the value of annuities, or
rights of dower and curtesy or may be adopted by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
rule of court. But, before the court will take judicial
notice of such tables, it ought to know, either by its
own experience or the general use of the table by
lawyers or actuaries, or its reputation, that it is
accurate. We have no knowledge· that the table
printed in the book in question has ever been used in
such a way that we may fairly assume it to be accurate. It seems to have been in print only since
1902, and as far as we know has never been actually
used for the purpose for which such tables are intended. If it is, as it purports to be, correctly copied
from a table authorized by statute in New York, a
different question might be presented ; but as the
case now stands this table was not admissible. That
it may have been harmful appears from the reference made to it by the judge in his charge.
"For this error the Judgment must be reversed."
Again in Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Arispe, supra,
_ the Texas Supreme Court held that:
"'The court erred in permitting plaintiffs, over
the objection of defendant, to introduce in evidence
the table of the expectation of the years of life, contained in the book entitled, "A Million of Facts:
Conkling's Handy Manual of Useful Information,
and Atlas of the World; all for twenty-five cents,"for the reason specified in defendant's bill of exception No. 1, and because the same was no authority,
and of no higher character than any cheap book sold
on railroads, and there was no evidence offered showing the correctness of the table, and it was calculated
to prejudice the minds of the jury against the defendant.' * * * Suffice it to say that this book,
however flattering may be its title, or alluring its
price, is not one of those standard works of which
the courts take judicial notice ~and recognize as
authority, and consequently it should have been exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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eluded, in the absence of any proof of its correctness.
On account of the errors indicated we conclude that
the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded."
In the case at bar, there was not a scintilla of evidence
"":'hich tended in any manner to authenticate or prove the
accuracy of the so-called United States Life Table. In fact,
the only testimony adduced at the trial, affirmatively
showed the contrary. Mr. Wood stated that it was his "understanding" that the United States Life Table was prepared by the Department of Commerce (R. 271). He had
obtained his copy several years previous (R. 273). However,
he did not know whether or not the table was used by in- ·
surance actuaries ( R. 2J3) , and he didn't think the table was
recognized by the statutes of Utah (R. 273). He knew of
no one, nor of any company in the State of Utah, who used
the table. It was used for comparison (R. 273). Clearly,
the foregoing testimony constituted no proper foundation
for admission of the vital· information allegedly contained
in the table.
The prejudicial eharacter of this improperly admitted
evidence can not be questioned. Attention already has been
invited to a comparison of the alleged present worth figures
set forth on Exhibits G and H, and to the substantial difference that an increased life expectancy of approximately
four and one-half years makes in such computations. It
also is significant that in its Instruction No. 13 (R. 65),
the trial court expres'Sly limited and qualified the jury's
consideration of information taken from American Experience Mortality Table, but no such qualifying instruction
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ever was given with respect to the information purportedly
taken from so-called United States Life Table. So far as the
latter table was concerned and of Exhibit H based thereon,
the jury were allowed an unrestricted field. Failure on the
part of a trial court to give such a qualifying instruction
in connection with the use of mortality tables has been held
to constitute prejudicial error. A vance v. Thompson, 387
Ill. 77, 55 N. E. (2d) 57, 60, cert. denied 323 U. S. 753,
65 S. Ct. 82.

III
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE AND RESULTED
FROM PASSION AND PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF
THE JURY, AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT·~s MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The jury returned a verdict in this case in the total
- amount of $70,000 (R. 72). It is submitted that this large
and excessive verdict, together with a series of prejudicial
incidents occurring during the trial, demonstrate that the
jury was influenced by passion and prejudice in arriving at
its verdict, and that the trial court therefore abused its dis_. cretion in failing to grant the defendant's motion for a new
·~ trial. Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. (2d) 123 .
..--/ For such an abuse of discretion, this Court properly may
~ take corrective action. Jensen v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.,
44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192.

:::-·

In order to achieve a big verdict in this case, counsel
for
plaintiff
apparently felt that every possible device had
5
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to be resorted to, to stir the passion of the jury and to
emphasize the issue of damages. The reason for this was
obvious. The evidence on the issue of liability was exceedingly weak. A brief outline of the pertinent facts will make
this clear. When the engine and cut of fourteen cars on
which plaintiff was riding at the time of his accident,
moved forward on the ice house or stock track, plaintiff was
stationed on the top of the rear or fourteenth car. He was
standing on the walkway at about the center of the car (R.
148). Plaintiff stated that he was standing near the middle
of the car because that was the safest place to ride in the
event of slack action (R. 160). In this position, a trainman
can catch his balance in the event of any jerk or slack
action in the train (R. 160). Some jerks and slack action in
a train movement are naturally expected (R. 169). The
plaintiff started forward from the center of the car, at the
time when the car he was on was about one car length from
the derail (R. 172). He intended to dismount when the car
had reached the main line switch, some 5.50 feet further
ahead (R. 160). There was a sharp curve in the track at
the point of the derail (R. 170). This is clearly illustrated
by the photograph, plaintiff's Exhibit B. When a freight
car hits a curve there is naturally some lurching and
wobbling of the car ( R. 171) . Plaintiff was familiar with
the track and with the curve (R. 165). But he started forward on the car, leaving his safe position at the center of
the car, just before the car he was riding hit the curve at
the derail (R. 171, 173). Plaintiff claimed, however, that
as the car reached the derail, he was crouched down preparatory to dismounting from the side ladder, when the
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slack on the train ran in with a violent jerk that dislodged
him and threw him from the car (R. 150). When he felt the
slack action, he had hold of his lantern and brake club with
one hand and hold of the grab iron on top of the car with
his other hand (R. 153). The foregoing facts, on the basis of
familiar and traditional principles of the law of negligence,
would be considered wholly insufficient to support a verdict.
See for example Gulf, M & N R. Co. v. Wells, 27·5 U. S. 455,
48 S. Ct. 151. But regardless of recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, which apparently have
changed traditional concepts of liability based upon fault in
cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (Missouri
Pac. R. Co. v. Keeton, 20'7 Ark. 793, 183 S. W. (2d) ·505,
reversed without opinion 326 U. S. 689, 66 S. Ct. 135; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, ... Utah ... , 187 P. (2d) 188, reversed
... U. S.... , 69 S. Ct. 413,), the plain fact still remains
that the evidence of liability in the instant case was exceptionally thin. Plaintiff's counsel, realizing th~at a heavy
verdict could not be expected so far as the issue of liability
was concerned, therefore resorted to various other means
and methods to influence the sympathy and prejudice of
the jury.
One of the plaintiff's chief efforts to influence the
judgment of the jury on the issue of damages, consisted
of the improper introduction in evidence of the Exhibits
G and H. As previously pointed out, the jury was permitted to hear testimony concerning these exhibits, to examine them, and then to take them to the jury room. As
elsewhere argued, the admission in evidence of these exhibits not only constituted unfair repetition and emphasis
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of exceedingly prejudicial testimony, but also was improper
as a matter of law. Especially harmful was the admission of
the unauthenticated and unproved life expectancy figures
reputedly taken from a so-called United States Life Table.
The information claimed to have been taken from this alleged table was admitted without any qualifying instruction by the trial court, such as given in connection with the
American Experience Table of Mortality (R. 65). As heretofore stated, the "hearsay" life expectancy figure from the
so-called United S'tates Life Table, indicated an increased
expectancy of approximately four and one-half years over
the American Experience Table. Undoubtedly, this figure
when included in the computations on Exhibit H had a
seriously prejudicial influence on the verdict returned by
the jury.
Another factor calculated to excite the passion and
prejudice of the jury, with telling effect upon the amount
of the verdict, was the improper and wholly unnecessary
exhibition to the jury of the stump of plaintiff's arm.
Counsel for plaintiff attempted such an exhibition twice
during plaintiff's case in chief (R. 158, 288). The first attempt was made during the direct examination of the plaintiff, himself. The trial court reserved ruling on the matter
at that time and counsel temporarily abandoned his attempt
(R. 158). It is significant to note, however, that on this
occasion even counsel for the plaintiff characterized the
proposed procedure as "inflammatory" (R. 158). The exhibition next was attempted during the direct examination
of plaintiff's witness Dr. Clegg. On that occasion, permission was requested for the ostensible reason that the ex-
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hibition was necessary in order for Dr. Clegg to point out
the condition of the stump (R. 228). The defendant objected on the following grounds : ( 1) that exhibition of the
stump was unnecessary to enable Dr. Clegg to testify concerning its condition; (2) that the- nature and extent of the
plaintiff's injury and the condition of the stump already
had been detailed by prior evidence and could be made even
more clear by further testimony from Dr. Clegg; (3) that
the nature and extent of the injury to plaintiff's arm was
in no way disputed. Defendant also pointed out to the trial
court that obviously the only purpose of the exhibition was
to inflame the sympathy and stir the prejudice of the jury
(R. 228-229). Nevertheless, the trial court overruled the
defendant's objections and permitted the exhibition (R.
229). A perusal of the subsequent testimony of Dr. Clegg
will reveal that not a single fact stated by him either required or was made more understandable by the exhibition
which followed (R. 229-233) . Exhibition of an impaired
member, where the nature and extent of the injury is not
disputed, as in the. present case, has been held to constitute
reversible error. O'Hara v. Central Illinois Light Co., 319
TIL App. 336, 49 N. E. (2d) 274, 278. In the cited case, the
Supreme Court of Illinois quoted with approval from an
earlier case of Wagner v. Chicago R. I & P. Ry. Co., 227
Ill. 114, 115 N. E. 201, 203, as follows:
"Whether one who is injured may exhibit an
injured member to the jury is primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and it is properly exercised in any case where the personal view will aid
the jury in understanding the evidence, and that
may be so where there is no controversy concerning
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the injury nor the extent of it, as was the fact in
this case. * * * Where, however, the only purpose and effect of an exhibition of that kind is to
excite feeling rather than to enlighten the jury as to
any fact or to aid in settling any disputed question
of fact, it should not be permitted. In this case, there
was not only no controversy concerning the injury
nor the extent of it, as was stated at the time of the
proposed exhibition, but the evident purpose was
to excite in the minds of the jury pity and commiseration for the condition of the plaintiff and
thereby to increase the damages. The exhibition for
the purpose which the record shows was intended
should not have been allowed, and if it now appeared
that the damages allowed were excessive it would
be necessary to reverse the judgment. * * *"
Still another prejudicial incident occurring during the
trial, and designed to arouse the sympathy and passion of
the jury, took place during the lengthy direct examination
of the plaintiff. At no time during the trial was the prior
good health of the plaintiff in dispute. Yet under questions
from his counsel, plaintiff testified that prior to his injury
his health was very good (R. 130). He also stated that when
he entered railroad service in November, 1945, he satisfactorily passed a physical examination; that he subsequently
was given another physical examination (R. 131). Then,
although the fact was wholly immaterial and trivial, plaintiff's counsel asked the plaintiff for the exact date of the
subsequent physical examination and urged the plaintiff
to look it up in the papers in his pocketbook (R. 131). This
required the plaintiff to reach into his pocketbook with his
one hand and awkwardly to fumble for the papers with the
same hand, thereby dramatically demonstrating to the jury

.
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his difficulty in handling such an object as a pocketbook.
After this little theatrical had been prolonged a sufficient
length of time to duly excite the jury, without the "vital"
date being produced, counsel announced that the date would
be looked up and the information given to the jury the next
morning (R. 131). Of course, no subsequent mention was
made of the matter the next morning or at any other time
during the course of the trial.
Still another example of the prejudicial manner in
which plaintiff's case was presented to the jury is illustrated by a recital of the circumstances· under which plaintiff interrupted the presentation of defendant's case in
chief, attempted to bolster his case with additional evidence
with respect to liability, and further emphasized the plaintiff's injury by cumulative evidence with respect to the
plaintiff's pain and suffering and disability. Upon completion of the examination of the witness Wood, counsel for
plaintiff· very specifically and emphatically stated that the
plaintiff rested his case, except for certain additional evidence concerning the present worth exhibits to be presented
through Mr. Wood after the noon recess (R. 25.3...254).
Thereafter, counsel for defendant made an opening statement to the jury (R. 254), following which the trial court
took the usual noon recess (R. 255). After the recess, the
plaintiff was permitted to introduce further testimony from
Mr. Wood (R. 2;56-280). Then, at the conclusion of Wood's
testimony, counsel for plaintiff requested permission of
the court to reopen the plaintiff's ·case for the stated purpose of introducing a "few bits of evidence" with respect
to the freight car upon which Bennett was riding at the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

time he was injured, and also for the purpose of introducing
additional evidence with respect to the present disability
of the plaintiff that more fully would cover the situation
than revealed by the testimony thus far (R. 280). Defendant objected to this request, for the reason that plaintiff previously had rested his case, with the exception of
the additional testimony from the witness Wood which then
had been given; also for the reason that the defendant already had begun its case and presented its opening statement and that proper procedure, therefore, indicated that
the defendant should be permitted to go forward with its
case (R. 280-281). But the trial court overruled the defendant's objections and perm,itted the plaintiff to introduce
further evidence. (R. 281). Thereafter, the plaintiff resumed
the witness stand and gave additional testimony touc;hing
upon the issue of liability, beyond any announced intention
of his counsel (R. 281-286). Next, the plaintiff called to the
witness stand Mrs. Bennett, the mother of the plaintiff (R.
286). She gave extensive cumulative testimony concerning
not merely the "present disability" of plaintiff, but also
graphic details concerning the plaintiff's pain and suffering
and the extent of his disability since the date of his injury
(R. 287-289). Only after all of the foregoing evidence had
been presented by the plaintiff, presumably as part of his
case in chief, was the defendant again permitted to proceed
(R. 289). AUhough the order of proof at the trial, ordinarily is a matter for the discretion of the trial court, the application of the 'Court's discretion ought not to be permitted
to work unf,airly against one of the contesting parties. In
the present case, the plaintiff not only was allowed to in-
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terrupt and break the momentum and effectiveness of the
defendant's case in chief, but the trial court also permitted
the plaintiff to bolster his case with additional and cumulative evidence on vital points, after hearing the proof to be
offered by the defendant as outlined in counsel's opening
statement.
Another factor which undoubtedly influenced the jury
and contributed to the excessive verdict was the trial court's
Instruction No. 11. In that instruction the trial court told
the jury what damages it might award to plaintiff in the
event it found the issues against the defendant. The charge
with respect to the several elements of damage was as follows (R. 63):
"In determining the amount of such damage,
you may consider the nature and extent of his injury thus sustained, and the amount of suffering,
both mental and physical, that he has endured, ,and
that he will probably endure in :the future; and the
extent to which he has been prevented and will be
prevented from engaging in the ordinary and usual
affairs of life as theretofore enjoyed by him, and
his loss of bodily function and disfigurement. You
may likewise consider his actual loss of past earnings, and any impairment of earning capacity in the
future."
The defendant specifically excepted to that part of
the foregoing instruction reading - "and his loss of bodily
function and disfigurement" (R. 350'). 'The quoted instruction advised the jury that it could conside,r five distinct
elements of damage in arriving at a verdict, namely: (1)
the nature and extent of the injury; (2) mental and physical
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pain and suffering, both past and future; (3) the extent to
which plaintiff had been and would be prevented from engaging in the usual affairs of life; (4) plaintiff's loss of
bodily function and ddsfigurement ; and ( 5) loss of past
earnings and impairment of future earning capacity.
It is at once apparent that to a marked degree, the foregoing instruction was duplicitous and authorized the assessment of double and even triple damages. Any damage
element involved in a "loss of bodily function and disfigurement" necessarily would be included in the elements
denominated "nature and extent of the injury" and "mental
and physical pain and suffering, both past and present."
Apart from being implicitly included in these two elements,
no principle of law sanctions recovery for "loss of bodily
function and disfigurement" in and of itself. Although instructions of a similarly redundant type were criticized by
this Court in Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P.
(2d) 649, 6·54, and Allison v. McCarthy, 106 Utah 278, 147
P. (2d) 870, 874, they were held not sufficiently erroneous·
to constitute reversible error. In both of the cited cases,
however, such instructions were expressly disapproved. It
is apparent from the present case, that scant attention has
been paid to this Court's criticism. Certainly, there can be
little doubt but that the instruction as given worked to the
material prejudice of the defendant and left the jury free
to find an excessive verdict based on a confusing and redundant instruction with respect to the recoverable elements
of damage. Contrast with Instruction 11, the precise definition of the recoverable elements of damage in a personal injury action as set forth by the United States Supreme Court
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in the leading case of Vicksburg and M. R. Co.' v. Putnam,
118 u. s. 545, 554:
"In an action for a personal injury, the plaintiff
is entitled to recover compensation, so far as it is
susceptible of an estimate in money, for the loss and
damage caused to him by the defendant's negligence,
including not only expenses incurred for medical attendance, and a reasonable sum for his pain and
suffering, but also a fair recompense for the loss of
what he would otherwise have earned in his trade or
profession, and has been deprived of the capacity of
earning, by the wrongful act of the defendant."

.-"·
,A

Finally, it is obvious that the amount of the verdict in
the instant case is grossly excessive, and suffi:cient in itself,
to demonstrate passion and prejudice on the part of the
jury. It is based upon the patently false assumption that
the plaintiff would be totally and permanently diS"abled for
the rest of his life. The testimony of the plaintiff indicated
that he entered railroad service in November, 19'45 (R.
131). In the year 1945 he worked for the railroad only
during the months of November and December (R. 161).
His average net earnings or "take home" pay for the year
1946 amounted to about $250 per month (R. 160). For the
year 1947, his average salary was about $265 per month
(R. 160). In the years 1946 and 1947, plaintiff claimed
that he earned more than at any other time he had worked
for the railroad (R. 161). For the three years 1945, 1946,
1947, plaintiff's average "take home" pay was $250 to $265
per month (R. 1611-162). Net earnings were gross earnings,
less deductions for railroad retirement and federal income
tax (R. 160). On the basis of the abortive Exhibit G, at an
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interest discount of 23,4 o/o, the present value of a monthly
annuity of $2'50 would amount to approximately $70,000, the
amount of the verdict returned in this case. Thus, the jury
assumed that for the remainder of plaintiff's claimed life
expectancy, he would be totally and permanently disabled.
This would be true even if it were assumed that a reasonable
award were made for the plaintiff's claim for pain and suffering. It is apparent that the verdict was based upon an
assumption contrary to all reason and human experience.
Certainly, a young man such as the plaintiff will not spend
the rest of his days in an idle vacuum. The evidence indicated
that he was a young man of good health, attractive personality and of better than average intelligence. He was a high
school graduate, with some college training (R. 130). Although he had sustained a serious handicap in the loss of his
arm, it is a matter of common knowledge that there are many
jobs and means of employment in which he can engage, if he
so desires. His earning capacity by no means has totally
vanished for the remainder of his life. Such, however, seemingly was the basis of the verdict returned by the excited
jury in this case.
In Pauly v. McCarthy, supra, this Court stated that a
"verdict might be so gross,ly excessive and disproportionate
to the iJ!jury that we could say from that fact alone that as
a matter of law the verdict must have been arrived at by
passion or prejudice." The defendant submits that the
present verdict of $70,000. would bring this case within that
category. In any event, the excessive verdict, plus the
pattern of prejudicial incidents and errors at the trial as
herein outlined, demonstrate that the jury was influenced
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by passion and prejudice in its decision, and that the trial
court abused its discretion in failing to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial.
Under the above circumstances and for the reasons
specified in the defendant's several assignments of error,
it is submitted that this Court should reverse and remand
the judgment entered in the lower court, with instructions
to grant a new trial.
Respectfully,
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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